Contains: - 1m-brag - tem - VaultMesh_Catalog_v1 - VAULTMESH-ETERNAL-PATTERN 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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VAULTMESH INFRASTRUCTURE CATALOG
Version 2.0 — Canon v1
Sovereign mesh network providing secure, cryptographically-verified infrastructure across distributed nodes. Core services run on the BRICK hypervisor and v1-nl-gate, with all access flowing over a Tailscale-powered SSH fabric. Designed as a living "civilization ledger": verifiable, reproducible, and portable.
VaultMesh Technologies Dublin, Ireland
Global Catalog Index
Complete inventory of VaultMesh infrastructure capabilities and cross-references.
| ID | Capability | Pages |
|---|---|---|
| VM-001 | Sovereign mesh network via Tailscale MagicDNS (story-ule.ts.net) | 1, 2, 3 |
| VM-002 | Per-node ed25519 SSH keys with IdentitiesOnly isolation | 1, 2, 4 |
| VM-003 | Cryptographic proof system with Merkle tree receipts | 1, 5, 6 |
| VM-004 | Multi-tier node architecture (Forge/Mine/Gate/Lab/Mobile) | 1, 2, 3 |
| VM-005 | libvirt/KVM virtualization on BRICK hypervisor | 2, 3 |
| VM-006 | Dual-vault pattern (Vaultwarden + HashiCorp Vault) | 1, 10 |
| VM-007 | Cross-platform support (Arch, Debian, BlackArch, Android/Termux, iOS) | 2, 4 |
| VM-008 | Lawchain compliance ledger integration | 5, 6 |
| VM-009 | Oracle reasoning engine with tactical chains | 5, 7 |
| VM-010 | Shield defensive monitoring system + TEM | 7, 8 |
| VM-011 | AppSec toolchain (Nuclei, Trivy, Semgrep, TruffleHog) | 7, 8 |
| VM-012 | Proof anchoring (local, OTS, ETH, mesh attestation) | 5, 6 |
| VM-013 | Braid protocol for foreign ledger interop | 5, 6 |
| VM-014 | MCP server integration for AI orchestration | 7, 8 |
| VM-015 | Cockpit/VNC console access for VMs | 3, 4 |
| VM-016 | SSH ControlMaster multiplexing for performance | 1, 4 |
| VM-017 | Forge Flow (nexus-0 → GitLab → CI → shield-vm) | 9 |
| VM-018 | LAN fallback addressing when Tailscale unavailable | 1, 2 |
| VM-019 | mesh-stack-migration portable deployment bundle | 1, 3, 10 |
| VM-020 | Agent task automation with scheduled triggers | 7, 8 |
| VM-021 | GitLab CI/CD on gate-vm (mesh-core-01) | 9, 10 |
| VM-022 | Grafana + Prometheus observability stack | 1, 10 |
| VM-023 | Lab HV experimental nodes (phoenix-01, lab-mesh-01, etc.) | 2, 10 |
1. Infrastructure Overview
VaultMesh runs on a sovereign mesh of home, cloud, and virtual nodes. Core services (GitLab, monitoring, backup, dual-vault) live on the BRICK hypervisor and v1-nl-gate, with all access flowing over a Tailscale-powered SSH fabric.
Key Findings
- Core "mesh-core-01" stack runs on a Debian VM (gate-vm) hosted on brick
- External edge/gate server (v1-nl-gate) fronts public connectivity and future tunnels
- shield-vm acts as the OffSec / TEM / machine-secrets node
- Dual-vault pattern: Vaultwarden for human secrets, HashiCorp Vault for machine/app secrets
- Tailscale tailnet + per-node SSH keys provide zero-trust style access across all layers
- Grafana + Prometheus give observability for both infrastructure and proof engines
Core Components
- Tailscale mesh network (story-ule.ts.net tailnet)
- GitLab (self-hosted) on gate-vm for source, CI, and artifacts
- MinIO object storage for backups and artifacts
- PostgreSQL for GitLab and future ledgers
- Prometheus + Grafana for metrics and dashboards
- Vaultwarden (human credentials) + HashiCorp Vault (machine secrets)
- shield-vm: OffSec agents, TEM daemon, security experiments
- lab HV: experimental cluster for Phoenix/PSI and chaos drills
Workflows / Pipelines
- Forge Flow: Android/laptop → SSH (Tailscale) → nexus-0 → edit/test → git push → GitLab on gate-vm → CI → deploy to shield-vm / lab
- Backup Flow: mesh-stack-migration bundle backs up GitLab/Postgres/Vaultwarden to MinIO with freshness monitoring and restore scripts
- Proof Flow: VaultMesh engines emit receipts and Merkle roots; DevOps release pipeline anchors PROOF.json and ROOT.txt to external ledgers
Security Notes
- No password SSH: ed25519 keys only, with IdentitiesOnly enforced
- Tailscale tailnet isolates nodes from the public internet; v1-nl-gate used as controlled edge
- Dual-vault split: Vaultwarden for human secrets; HashiCorp Vault for machine/app secrets and CI
- Backups stored in MinIO, monitored by backup-freshness service with Prometheus metrics and Grafana alerts
2. Node Topology
VaultMesh spans four primary tiers—Forge, Mine, Gate, and Lab—with mobile endpoints riding on top. The BRICK hypervisor anchors the virtualization layer, while v1-nl-gate acts as the outer gate.
Key Findings
- Clear separation between Forge (nexus-0), Core Mesh (gate-vm on brick), Edge Gate (v1-nl-gate), and Lab HV (ephemeral)
- BRICK hypervisor hosts the critical core VMs: debian-golden (template), gate-vm (mesh-core-01), shield-vm (shield-01)
- Tailscale tailnet binds everything together with MagicDNS and per-node hostnames
- v1-nl-gate is ready to act as external ingress or exit node for future services
- Node roles are stable but designed to evolve; lab nodes are intentionally ephemeral
Forge Nodes
| Node | Hostname | OS | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| nexus-0 | 100.67.39.1 (Tailscale) | BlackArch | Primary forge (dev) |
| kali-forge | (Tailscale IP) | Kali | Secondary OffSec lab |
Mine Nodes — Primary Infrastructure
| Node | Hostname | OS | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| gamma | gamma.story-ule.ts.net | Arch Linux | Home primary |
| beta | beta.story-ule.ts.net | Arch Linux | Backup node |
| brick | brick.story-ule.ts.net | Debian | Dell server, HV |
| w3 | w3.story-ule.ts.net | Raspbian | Raspberry Pi node |
Gate Nodes — Edge / Exit
| Node | Hostname | OS | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| v1-nl-gate | v1-nl-gate.story-ule.ts.net | Debian | Netherlands external gate |
| gate-vm | gate-vm.story-ule.ts.net | Debian | mesh-core-01 (core stack) |
VM Nodes — On brick (libvirt/KVM)
| Node | Hostname | OS | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| debian-golden | debian-golden.story-ule.ts.net | Debian | Golden image / template |
| gate-vm | gate-vm.story-ule.ts.net | Debian | Core services (GitLab, etc.) |
| shield-vm | shield-vm.story-ule.ts.net | Debian | Shield / TEM / machine vault |
Lab Nodes — Experimental (Lab HV)
| Node | Hostname | Role |
|---|---|---|
| lab-mesh-01 | lab-mesh-01 | Multi-node mesh tests |
| lab-agent-01 | lab-agent-01 | Agent/orchestration experiments |
| lab-chaos-01 | lab-chaos-01 | Chaos/failure drills |
| phoenix-01 | phoenix-01 | Phoenix/PSI prototypes |
Mobile Nodes
| Node | Hostname | OS | Port |
|---|---|---|---|
| shield | shield.story-ule.ts.net | Android/Termux | 22 |
| bank-mobile | bank-mobile.story-ule.ts.net | iOS | 8022 |
LAN Fallbacks
| Node | LAN IP |
|---|---|
| gamma | 192.168.0.191 |
| brick | 192.168.0.119 |
| beta | 192.168.0.236 |
3. Virtualization Layer
The BRICK server runs libvirt/KVM and hosts the core VaultMesh VMs: debian-golden (template), gate-vm (mesh-core-01), and shield-vm (shield-01). Cockpit and VNC provide management and console access.
Key Findings
- BRICK is the single hypervisor for core VaultMesh VMs
- debian-golden serves as a reusable golden image to clone new VMs
- gate-vm runs the mesh-stack-migration bundle (GitLab, MinIO, Prometheus, Grafana, Vaultwarden, backup-freshness, etc.)
- shield-vm is the Shield/OffSec node and home of the machine-secrets vault and TEM stack
- VM networking uses libvirt NAT (192.168.122.x), with VNC reachable via SSH tunnels
VM Network Layout
| VM | NAT IP | VNC Port | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| debian-golden | 192.168.122.187 | 5900 | Golden image / base template |
| gate-vm | 192.168.122.236 | 5901 | mesh-core-01 core stack host |
| shield-vm | 192.168.122.73 | 5902 | Shield/OffSec/TEM + machine vault |
Workflows
- VM Management: Cockpit → https://brick:9090 → "Virtual Machines"
- Console Access:
ssh -L 5901:localhost:5901 brick→vnc://localhost:5901 - Image Pipeline: Update debian-golden → snapshot → clone → new VM
- Join to Mesh: Boot VM → configure SSH → join Tailscale → register in SSH config
Security Notes
- VNC ports are not exposed directly; they're reached via SSH tunnel into brick
- Each VM uses its own SSH host keys and per-node authorized_keys
- NAT isolation (192.168.122.x) reduces blast radius from VM compromise
- Installing Tailscale inside gate-vm/shield-vm avoids public exposure
Dependencies
- libvirt, qemu-kvm, Cockpit, cockpit-machines on brick
- SSH and Tailscale inside each VM (where needed)
- TigerVNC or similar client on the operator's laptop
4. SSH Key Architecture
VaultMesh uses a strict per-node ed25519 SSH key model with IdentitiesOnly isolation, ControlMaster multiplexing, and mesh-wide access via Tailscale.
Key Findings
- One keypair per destination node (id_gamma, id_brick, id_v1-nl-gate, id_gate-vm, id_shield-vm, etc.)
- IdentitiesOnly enforces key isolation and prevents cross-host key probing
- ControlMaster/ControlPath provide fast multiplexed SSH sessions
- Tailscale hostnames (story-ule.ts.net) give stable addressing; LAN IPs are fallback
- External service keys (GitHub/GitLab) are separate from infra keys
Key Inventory (Infra Nodes)
| Key File | Target Node | Algorithm |
|---|---|---|
| id_gamma | gamma | ed25519 |
| id_beta | beta | ed25519 |
| id_brick | brick | ed25519 |
| id_w3 | w3 | ed25519 |
| id_v1-nl-gate | v1-nl-gate | ed25519 |
| id_gate-vm | gate-vm | ed25519 |
| id_debian-golden | debian-golden | ed25519 |
| id_shield-vm | shield-vm | ed25519 |
Forge + Mobile Keys
| Key File | Target | Algorithm |
|---|---|---|
| id_nexus-0 | nexus-0 | ed25519 |
| id_kali-forge | kali-forge | ed25519 |
| id_shield | shield | ed25519 |
| id_bank-mobile | bank-mobile | ed25519 |
External Service Keys
| Key File | Service |
|---|---|
| id_ed25519_github | GitHub |
| id_ed25519_gitlab | GitLab |
SSH Config Structure
Host *
ServerAliveInterval 30
ServerAliveCountMax 3
TCPKeepAlive yes
ControlMaster auto
ControlPath ~/.ssh/cm-%r@%h:%p
ControlPersist 10m
IdentitiesOnly yes
HashKnownHosts no
StrictHostKeyChecking accept-new
AddKeysToAgent yes
UseKeychain yes
Compression yes
Host nexus-0
HostName 100.67.39.1
User root
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_nexus-0
Host brick
HostName brick.story-ule.ts.net
User sovereign
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_brick
Host gate-vm
HostName gate-vm.story-ule.ts.net
User debian
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_gate-vm
Host shield-vm
HostName shield-vm.story-ule.ts.net
User debian
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_shield-vm
Security Notes
- ed25519 keys provide strong security with small keys/signatures
- IdentitiesOnly ensures ssh never offers the wrong key to the wrong host
- StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new uses TOFU while still catching host key changes
- No password authentication; all critical nodes are key-only
5. Cryptographic Proof System
VaultMesh uses a Merkle-tree-based proof system with receipts, roots, and cross-ledger anchoring. Each serious action (deploy, anchor, oracle decision, incident handling) emits a receipt.
Key Findings
- All significant actions generate cryptographic receipts in append-only logs
- Merkle trees allow efficient inclusion proofs for large sets of receipts
- Anchors can be written to local files, Bitcoin (OTS), Ethereum, or mesh peers
- The release pipeline for vm-spawn automatically computes Merkle roots and anchors proof artifacts
- Braid-style interoperability allows importing and emitting foreign ledger roots
Proof Lifecycle
- Action occurs (e.g., Guardian anchor, deployment, oracle decision)
proof_generatecreates a signed receipt with a Blake3 hash of the canonical JSON- Receipts accumulate until a batch threshold is reached
proof_batchconstructs a Merkle tree and computes the rootproof_anchor_*writes the root to local files, timestamps, or blockchainsproof_verifyallows any future verifier to confirm receipt integrity against a given root
Anchoring Strategies
| Type | Method | Durability |
|---|---|---|
| local | Files in data/anchors/ |
Node-local |
| ots | OpenTimestamps → Bitcoin | Public blockchain |
| eth | Calldata/contract → Ethereum | Public blockchain |
| mesh | Cross-attest via other nodes | Federated durability |
Braid Protocol
braid_import– import foreign ledger roots from other chains/nodesbraid_emit– expose local roots for others to importbraid_status– track imported vs. local roots and regression- Ensures root sequences are strictly advancing (no rollback without detection)
Receipt Schema (Conceptual)
{
"proof_id": "uuid",
"action": "guardian_anchor",
"timestamp": "ISO8601",
"data_hash": "blake3_hex",
"signature": "ed25519_sig",
"witnesses": ["node_id"],
"chain_prev": "prev_proof_id"
}
Security Notes
- Blake3 hashing for speed and modern security
- Ed25519 signatures for authenticity and non-repudiation
- Merkle trees make inclusion proofs O(log n)
- Multiple anchoring paths provide defense in depth against ledger loss
6. Lawchain Compliance Ledger
Lawchain is the compliance-focused ledger that tracks regulatory obligations, oracle answers, and audit trails via receipts. It integrates with the proof system to ensure every compliance answer has a cryptographic backbone.
Key Findings
- Oracle answers are validated against a schema before being recorded
- Each answer is hashed and bound into a receipt, linking legal semantics to proofs
- Federation metrics allow multi-node Lawchain sync across the mesh
- Policy evaluation is driven by JSON inputs and produces JSON results for downstream tools
Oracle Answer Schema (vm_oracle_answer_v1)
{
"question": "string",
"answer_text": "string",
"citations": [{
"document_id": "string",
"framework": "string",
"excerpt": "string"
}],
"compliance_flags": {
"gdpr_relevant": true,
"ai_act_relevant": false,
"nis2_relevant": true
},
"gaps": ["string"],
"insufficient_context": false,
"confidence": "high"
}
Compliance Q&A Workflow
- Operator (or system) asks Lawchain a question
- RAG/Retrieve context from policy docs and regulations
- LLM generates an answer draft
- Answer is validated against vm_oracle_answer_v1 schema
- Hash (Blake3 over canonical JSON) computed and receipt generated
- Receipt anchored via proof system and stored in Lawchain
Compliance Frameworks Tracked
- GDPR – data protection and subject rights
- EU AI Act – risk classification, obligations, and logs
- NIS2 – network and information security
- Custom extensions can map additional frameworks (e.g., SOC2, ISO 27001)
Security Notes
- Answer hash computed as
blake3(json.dumps(answer, sort_keys=True)) - Receipts bind answer content, timestamps, and possibly node identity
gapsandinsufficient_contextprevent fake certainty in legal answers- Citations must reference real sources, enabling audit of answer provenance
7. Oracle Engine & Shield Defense
The Oracle Engine provides structured reason → decide → act chains, while Shield and TEM form the defensive veil. Together they detect threats, log them to the proof system, and (optionally) orchestrate responses.
Key Findings
- Oracle chains decisions through explicit reasoning steps, not opaque actions
- Every significant decision can emit receipts into the proof spine
- Shield monitors multiple vectors (network, process, file, device, etc.)
- Response levels span from passive logging to active isolation or countermeasures
- Agent tasks allow scheduled or triggered operations (e.g., periodic scans)
Oracle Tools
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| oracle_status | Node status and capabilities |
| oracle_reason | Analyze situation, propose actions |
| oracle_decide | Make autonomous decision |
| oracle_tactical_chain | Full reason → decide → act chain |
Oracle Tactical Chain Flow
- Context: Collect current state (logs, metrics, alerts, lawchain state)
- Reason:
oracle_reasonproduces candidate actions with justifications - Decide:
oracle_decideselects an action based on risk tolerance and constraints - Act: Execute playbooks, or keep in dry-run mode for simulation
- Prove: Generate a receipt and anchor via proof system (optional but recommended)
Shield Monitor Vectors
| Vector | Detection Capability |
|---|---|
| network | Port scans, unusual flows |
| wifi | Rogue APs, deauth attempts |
| bluetooth | Device enumeration/anomalies |
| usb | Storage/HID abuse |
| process | Suspicious binaries, behavior |
| file | Unauthorized modifications |
Shield Response Levels
| Level | Action |
|---|---|
| log | Record event only |
| alert | Notify operator (Slack/email/etc.) |
| block | Prevent connection/action |
| isolate | Quarantine node/container/service |
| counter | Active response (e.g., honeypots) |
Security Notes
- Dry-run mode is default for dangerous operations; production actions require explicit opt-in
- Risk tolerance levels gate what Shield/TEM may do without human approval
- All automated decisions can be bound to receipts for post-incident audit
8. AppSec Toolchain
VaultMesh uses an integrated application security toolchain rooted on shield-vm and CI pipelines. It combines vulnerability scanning, secret detection, SBOM generation, and IaC analysis.
Key Findings
- Nuclei, Trivy, Semgrep, TruffleHog, Gitleaks, Checkov, Syft, and Grype cover distinct layers
- shield-vm is the natural home for heavy security scans and OffSec tooling
- CI pipelines can call out to shield-vm or run scanners directly in job containers
- Secret detection runs in both pre-commit and CI stages for defense-in-depth
- SBOM generation and vulnerability scanning support long-term supply chain tracking
Tool Capabilities
| Tool | Target Types | Output |
|---|---|---|
| nuclei | URLs, IPs, domains | Findings by severity |
| trivy | Images, dirs, repos, SBOMs | CVEs, secrets, configs |
| semgrep | Source code directories | Security findings |
| trufflehog | Git, S3, GCS, etc. | Verified secrets |
| gitleaks | Git repos, filesystems | Secret locations |
| checkov | Terraform, K8s, Helm, etc. | Misconfigurations |
| syft | Images, dirs, archives | CycloneDX/SPDX SBOM |
| grype | Images, dirs, SBOMs | Vulnerability list |
MCP Tools
- offsec_appsec_nuclei_scan
- offsec_appsec_trivy_scan
- offsec_appsec_semgrep_scan
- offsec_appsec_trufflehog_scan
- offsec_appsec_gitleaks_scan
- offsec_appsec_checkov_scan
- offsec_appsec_syft_sbom
- offsec_appsec_grype_scan
Workflows
- SBOM Pipeline: Syft → produce CycloneDX JSON → Grype → vulnerability report
- Pre-merge Scans: CI job runs Semgrep, Trivy, Gitleaks on merge requests
- Periodic Deep Scans: shield-vm runs scheduled AppSec scans, logging high-severity findings
- Policy Integration: High-severity or critical findings feed into Lawchain/Lawchain-like policies
Security Notes
- Nuclei and Trivy should be rate-limited when targeting external assets
- Secret detection in CI uses only_verified where possible to reduce noise
- Baseline files can exclude accepted findings while still tracking new issues
- AppSec findings for high-value systems may be recorded as receipts in the proof system
9. Forge Flow — From Phone to Shield
The Forge Flow describes how code moves from the Sovereign's phone and forge node (nexus-0) through GitLab on gate-vm, into CI, and finally onto shield-vm and lab nodes.
Key Findings
- Primary forge is nexus-0 (BlackArch), reachable via Tailscale from Android/laptop
- vaultmesh repo lives on nexus-0 under
/root/work/vaultmesh - Git remote points to GitLab on gate-vm (gitlab.mesh.local)
- GitLab CI handles lint → test → build → deploy
- Production-like deployments land on shield-vm; experiments land on Lab HV nodes
Forge Flow Diagram
Android / Laptop
↓ (Tailscale SSH)
nexus-0 (BlackArch forge)
↓ (git push)
GitLab @ gate-vm (mesh-core-01)
↓ (CI: lint → test → build)
shield-vm (Shield / TEM) and Lab HV (phoenix-01, etc.)
Steps
1. Inception (Connect to Forge)
ssh VaultSovereign@100.67.39.1 # nexus-0 via Tailscale
tmux attach -t sovereign || tmux new -s sovereign
2. Forge (Edit & Test)
cd /root/work/vaultmesh
nvim .
python3 -m pytest tests/ -v
python3 cli/vm_cli.py guardian status
python3 cli/vm_cli.py console sessions
3. Transmit (Git Push to GitLab)
git add -A
git commit -m "feat(guardian): improve anchor receipts"
git push origin main # or feature branch
4. Transform (GitLab CI on gate-vm)
.gitlab-ci.ymlstages: lint → test → build → deploy
5. Manifest (Deploy to Shield or Lab)
- CI deploy job: main → shield-vm, lab branches → lab-mesh-01 / phoenix-01
- Manual fallback:
ssh shield-vm && cd /opt/vaultmesh && git pull
6. Observe (Metrics & Proofs)
- Grafana dashboards (gate-vm) for system and proof metrics
- Guardian CLI for roots and scrolls
- Lawchain/oracle dashboards for compliance view
Infrastructure Roles in the Flow
- nexus-0 → live forge, fast iteration, experiments
- gate-vm → GitLab + CI + registry + observability
- shield-vm → OffSec/TEM node and primary runtime for security engines
- Lab HV → ephemeral experimentation environment
10. Canonical Infrastructure — VaultMesh v1
This page defines the canonical infrastructure for VaultMesh as of the first full catalog: which nodes exist, what runs where, and which services are considered "core mesh".
Key Findings
- BRICK + v1-nl-gate + nexus-0 form the spine of the system
- gate-vm (mesh-core-01) is the canonical host for the mesh-stack-migration bundle
- shield-vm is the canonical Shield/TEM node with OffSec tooling and machine-secrets vault
- Dual-vault pattern is standard: Vaultwarden (human), HashiCorp Vault (machine)
- Grafana is the canonical dashboard layer; Wiki.js is explicitly not part of the new architecture
Canonical Nodes and Roles
| Node | Role | Description |
|---|---|---|
| nexus-0 | Forge | Primary dev/forge node (BlackArch) |
| brick | Hypervisor | Hosts core VMs (debian-golden, gate-vm, shield-vm) |
| v1-nl-gate | External Gate | Cloud-facing edge server, future ingress |
| gate-vm | mesh-core-01 (Core Stack) | GitLab, MinIO, Postgres, Prometheus, Grafana, Vaultwarden, backup-freshness, Traefik, WG-Easy |
| shield-vm | shield-01 (Shield/TEM) | OffSec agents, TEM, HashiCorp Vault, incidents & simulations |
| lab-* | Experimental Mesh | lab-mesh-01, lab-agent-01, lab-chaos-01, phoenix-01 |
Canonical Core Services (gate-vm / mesh-core-01)
- GitLab – source control, CI/CD
- MinIO – object storage & backups
- PostgreSQL – GitLab and future service DBs
- Prometheus – metrics
- Grafana – dashboards (infra, backup freshness, proof metrics)
- Vaultwarden – human password vault (browsers, logins)
- backup-freshness – monitors MinIO backup age
- Traefik – reverse proxy and ingress
- WG-Easy (optional) – simplified WireGuard access
Canonical Security / Shield Services (shield-vm)
- HashiCorp Vault – machine/app secrets
- TEM daemon – threat transmutation engine
- OffSec tools and MCP – Oracle, Shield, AppSec scanners
- Agent/task scheduler – scheduled security workflows
- Optional: local Prometheus exporters for node/security metrics
Explicitly Non-Core
- Wiki.js – not part of canonical infra; documentation handled via Git-based docs/portals
- Legacy projects marked ARCHIVE (e.g., old offsec-shield architecture, sovereign-swarm)
Migration & Portability
mesh-stack-migration/ enables redeploying the entire core stack to a fresh host:
- Copy bundle → set
.env→docker compose up -d - Run FIRST-LAUNCH and DRY-RUN checklists
- VMs can be moved or recreated using debian-golden as base
Evolution Rules
If a service becomes critical and stateful, it must:
- Emit receipts and have a documented backup/restore plan
- Expose metrics consumable by Prometheus
- Be referenced in the Canonical Infrastructure page with node placement
Experimental services stay on Lab HV until they prove their value.
VAULTMESH
Earth's Civilization Ledger
Solve et Coagula
vaultmesh.org • offsecshield.com • vaultmesh.earth
VaultMesh Infrastructure Catalog v2.0 — Canon v1 VaultMesh Technologies • Dublin, Ireland